The past 20 years have seen a welcome change from the traditional patemalist view of the patient as passive recipient of medical advice. This development results from the increasing range of treatment options now available, the wider discussion of these choices both within the profession and more publicly by the media. Patients now wish to participate in decisions about their clinical management to a far greater degree than formerly.
At the same time clinical choices have become increasingly underpinned by reliable outcome data, chiefly as a result of randomised clinical trials, which are now accepted as the best method of determining the relative benefits of competing treatments.' Such trials have been highly influential in changing the clinical management of common conditions both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.2 3 In our own specialty of cancer medicine, new approaches in chemoprophylaxis and in screening, novel chemotherapy techniques, unconventional radiotherapy fractionation, and so on can be rigorously evaluated only by randomised clinical trials. Though It is neither faintheartedness nor a disinclination to be questioned that discourages the clinician; rather, it is the overwhelming difficulty of describing the details of a potentially valuable (but as yet unproved) new remedy, gaining the patient's assent, and later having to inform her that she has been randomised to receive radiotherapy alone. However carefully the pros and cons of chemotherapy may have been explained, the result of the randomisation often leads the doctor towards a rather shabby display of back pedalling, in which the possible advantages of the chemotherapy are "talked down" and perhaps the side effects "talked up." The patient may become extremely distressed, which is not only counterproductive (with refusal to participate) but also alarming for the doctor and by no means easily resolved.
It does not take many such consultations to change a well intentioned and committed trialist into a disgruntled clinician who no longer feels that the game is worth the candle. It can be extremely difficult to sustain the doctor-patient relationship through such a harrowing discussion, and particularly unfortunate for patients such as those in the example above whose treatment by radiotherapy (that is, the control group) would In between there will be more complex judgments in which the outlines of alternative treatments must be explained and the patient reassured that the treatment policy decided on will always be in his or her best interests. The crucial point here may sometimes include the question of whether to disclose that this decision is based on a randomisation in which the physician plays no direct part. This may be very unnerving for patients, and in some situations-for example, in discussion with parents of a child with cancer (in which age group randomised trials are usual)-it may be extremely difficult. Many patients wish to help to advance medical knowledge, and gain comfort and support from feeling that they are doing so, although these same patients may feel disturbed by the thought that their doctor is not making the fundamental decision about treatment policy.
We believe that many doctors already vary what they say to patients in just the way we describe. We suggest that they should not be ashamed of so doing-whatever the ethicists say. Just as they know that the ethical imperative always to tell the complete truth in all aspects of clinical practice is wholly impractical, so also is the notion that fully informed consent means an uncompromising discussion of the design and execution of a clinical trial to every patient.
The deliberate use of what Collins et al describe as "humanly inappropriate" written informed consent procedures'2 led in the ISIS-2 trial (of streptokinase and aspirin in acute myocardial infarction) to a very poor recruitment in the United States (where such consent was deemed essential) compared with the United Kingdom, where consent was obtained in the manner considered best for the individual patient. Collins et al draw attention to the thousands of deaths which may have resulted worldwide from the unnecessary delay in completing the study. Cancer treatments are far more costly, toxic, and prolonged than the treatments in the ISIS-2 trial and a greater degree of discussion will therefore usually be necessary, though the principle involved is just the same. An informed consent procedure must be used which is humane for that individual patient, and not for the study as a whole.
The counter argument will be that we are advocating a patemalistic "doctor knows best" approach. We are not. We wish to see this discussion with the patient informed by the same wisdom, judgment, and kindness which should be part of all aspects of clinical care. We believe that the ethical pressure that has put us so much on the defensive is flawed. It may in part result from fears of a medicolegal nature, many of which have been imported from the United States, where litigation for alleged medical negligence is so much more common. It may be that lawyers and ethicists in the United Kingdom will wish to push us in the same direction, but we should resist them on grounds both of common sense and humanity.
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A PATIENT WHO CHANGED MY PRACTICE
An uncomfortable surprise
In that limbo between passing finals and starting my first house job I took a surgical locum post in a north London hospital. I remember feeling a profound ambivalence: the kudos of a newly qualified doctor uncomfortably mixed with a realistic appreciation of my inadequacies. The senior registrar, a brusque, matter of fact individual, recognised my plight, and planned a gentle induction to practical procedures. I was asked to catheterise the man in the corner ofthe ward. Drawing back the curtain I saw a young man made old by disease (I believe he had motor neurone disease, but I have never been sure). He was bent double, his body stiff and unyielding as if in rigor mortis. With great difficulty a nurse and I eased him on to his back and attempted to unlock his hips and knees and separate his legs. He expressed his pain in his eyes-moist, pleading for release. His mute resignation unnerved me more than if he had cried out in pain and protest. The nurse, a kindly middle aged lady, stroked his hand and called him by his first name. His eyes narrowed and I sensed a welling up of indignation at being patronised.
I attempted with great difficulty to remember the sequence of events in the only catheterisation which I had witnessed. Initially all went well. I introduced the tip of the catheter into the urethra and began to push gently. I had decided that the slower I was the less likely the patient was to feel pain.
My sense of tentative control precipitously evaporated when, push as I might, the catheter would advance no further. Confusion gave way to increasing panic. Should I push harder? The nurse had obviously decided that it was nothing to do with her and resumed stroking the patient's hand. I risked looking at him. His eyes were closed, the lids gently flickering. Impotence and guilt overwhelmed me. A desperate last shove was rewarded by a gush of warm urine up my arm and over the bed. This time we exchanged glances of mutual and profound relief. A muffled apology for the time I had taken preceded my dash for the door.
The senior registrar, unaware of the trauma I had endured, said, "Sad case. Brilliant surgeon." I was about to quip that I did not think surgery would be my metier when he added, "He qualified in this hospital-only six or seven years before me." I realised that the senior registrar was talking about my patient. Why was I given the job of catheterising him? Surely it should have been done by a consultant? What must he have thought of my ineptitude? Did he realise that I didn't know he was a doctor?
That evening I shared my sense ofbetrayal with my wife. Her reaction was sympathetic and supportive, but she asked how I would have done things differently had I known that the patient was a doctor. I confessed I would have done exactly the same. My anger had something to do with hierarchy and status. He was a "brilliant surgeon" and I was a ham fisted tyro. Somehow or other he deserved better.
Over the next few days I thought of little else. I avoided that end of the ward as much as possible, despite the urge to apologise. By the third day my despair had filtered back to the senior registrar. If I had expected a sympathetic hearing I was to be disappointed. "It's quite simple," he said bluntly. "You imply that had you known he was a doctor you'd have acted differently. Isn't everyone entitled to expect the same treatment? Tailoring treatment to the perceived status of a patient is a travesty."
Of course, he was right. It was just as well that I learnt such a lesson early on in my medical career. Many have not.-ROBERT WILKINS is a consultant psychiatrist in Berkshire. We are delighted to receive submissions of up to 600 words on A paper (or patient or book) that changed my practice, A memorable patient, The one message I would like to leave behind, or related topics.
